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-2REPLY TO PART

I

Respondent attempts to treat the
second paragraph of the Will as if it
were the only provision therein.

It

is true that the grant contained in
the second paragraph of the Will is
in indefinite language stating neither
fee nor life estate and stating no
duration.

If the provision could stand alone
without qualification by other provisions
of the Will, there is no

questi~n

but

that the law by a presumption will

create the maximum estate,

(See Section

57-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, for
conveyances~

and Section 74-1-36, Utah

Code annotated,

1953~

for devise) but

the law requires giving effect to all
the provisions of a Will where possible
and as a consequence one provision cannot be treated in cont:ridictio:n 't«) the
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balance of the Will where all provisions may receive a consistant effect.
It is contended that the Testatrix
inserted the following 5 provisions in
the Will to provide what happens "in
the event the children do not get the
fee."

Such a contention is contrary

to the repeated, unambiguous, and
clear declarations of the Testatrix,
and requires an interpretation that
makes many provisions inconsistant.
By

giving normal meaning to the terms,

all provisions can be given consistant
effect.
It is acknowledged that the property, at the time of the execution
of the Will, would produce a relatively
small income.

It was being used as a

fruit orchard.

But this is precisely
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the reason for the seventh provision
in the will giving the executor the
power to exhange the asset for A.T.&To
Stock.
The case of Schomp vs. Brown, 335p
2d 847 does not rule as contended by
respondent.

In addition, it is distin-

guishable because the first taker was
granted a power to invade the corpus.
The court refused to impose a trust for
the remainderman because of the power
to invade, but declared that the gift
over estate holder had a cause of action
in the event the first taker failed to
fulfill the commitments imposed for
the protection of the following estate.
The rule attributed by Respondent
to Parker vs. Parker, 46 Mass 134 is
agreed with provided duration is not
given and provided it is not coupled

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

with provisions that modify.
the presumption mentioned

This is

above~

Chapman v. Check, 16 A. 407, 409,
81 Meo 109 cited by Respondant states

the rule alledged by Appellant:

That

it is a general description of the
property, not a statement of the size
of the estate created.
It is argued that an estate vested

upon the Testatrix's death, in Orvis
Call and Bessie Call Nielson.

This

is agreed with, but our question concerns the size ot the estate that vestedy
not the time of vesting.

The law

favors early vesting (i.e. time of
testatrix's death) where possible.
33 Am Jur, Life Estates, Remainders,
s

Etc. s 106.

There is no reason why the

estate granted Orvis Call, Bessie Call
Nielson and Don Lewis Ryan could not
vest upon the testatrix's deathe

Ob-
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viously this is the case here ..

In re Colleais Estate, 233 p 2d
554 cited by respondant is distinguishable because there was a request of the
first taker and not clear gift over ..
The rule in Pruse v. Beasley, 335
p 2d 346 as set forth in Respondants
brief is misleading because it omits
a part of the rule as quoted in that
case.
'~

devise of the residue
a
testators property posses all
of the property which he was
entitled to devise or bequeath
at the time of his death not
otherwise eff rectuall¥ ~~l~s'(f£
or bequeathed by fils w:tlll,-,=

Appellant concurs with this
its complete

1n

form~

Shippy v .. Elliott, 327 p
distinguishable

b~:cause

the gift i•orve:r

was not mandatory but merely in

te~1l¥.~:s
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of desire of testatrix&

Also, the

first taker had an unlimited power to
invade the corpus.
The same can be said of Fields
vs. Fields, 3 p 2d 771 ..

REPLY TO PART II
Respondant's argument assumes the
very point in question.

The question

is whether or not a fee was created not
whether or not there is an attempt to

cut it down.

It is argued that a grant for life
with a remainder following gives nothing
to the first

taker~

It is believed that

such a novel theory needs no reply ..
It is contended that the Will does
not give a basis to divide the estate.,
A deed granting an express life estate
followed by an

ess remainde:rc

does not contain a basis of

div:li~Li(l,n.,
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The answer is obvious.

The law of

estates defines the rights and duties
of each estate.

There is no contention

that the estates are divided.
The citations of the repugnancy
rule by respondant is not disputed.
The issue in our case is different.
The question before the court is the
size of the estate.

It is argued that

the terms of the Will should be construed inconsistant with each other so
that the repugnancy doctrine can apply.
Such is contrary to law.

Section

74-2-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
REPLY

TO

PART III

Appellant's argument in the original
brief deals with the issue of lapse
raised by Respondant at Part Ills

Re-

spondant, however, goes much in detail
on the time of the vesting of estates
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.,.,g ...

contingent upon the death of the first

takerQ

The vesting of the estate in

Don Lewis Ryan is in absolutely no

wa~r

contingent upon the death of the first
takero

Only possession must await the

termination of the life estatem

The

vesting of the estate in Don Lewis

Ryan was contingent only upon his surviving the testatrix..

There can be

no dispute under the law on the time
of the vesting of this estatea

It is

not at issue.
The cases cited by Respondent deals
with the time of vesting of estates
contingent upon death.
In re Gormley's Estate, 338 p 2d
457

is distinguishable because the grant

to the first taker was in 'Ycomplete amJ

perfect ownership" and also time of vest-

ing was at issueo
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REPLY TO PART IV
The seventh provision is in mandatory language.

It authorizes the

sale of the property for the express
purpose of substituting alternative
property.

The language is not mere

permission or words of request, it
is a command.

There is no need for

a power to exchange the asset if the
estate is in fee simple - such is one
of the inherent rights of a fee simple.
However, such power is not inherent
with a life estate and must be specifically given to be free of protest by
the remainderman.
It is contended that the power of
exchange is an absolute power of disposition.

This seems novel in view

of the compulsory purchase of stock
from said sale.

It is a power broad
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enough to exchange the asset for stock
only.

It is difficult to imagine a

more restricted power of disposition.
Such power is logically consistant only
with a life estate.
It is true that if we could construe
only parts of a will and completely
disregard all other parts that any grant
to a person or persons without further
qualification regardless of the share
of each grantee would create a fee
simple by operation of the recognized
presumption.

But the seventh provision,

like the second provision of the will,
does not stand alone.
One of the distinguishing factors
of a life estate is that the duration
of such estate is always for the period
of a life as lives.
In the will in question, the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Juration of the estate of the first
takers is given clearly in the third,
fourth, and fifth provisions, all of
which show the termination time of
such estate to be at their

death~

The seventh provision does not
give a different duration than exists
for the second paragraphQ

There is no

increase of right granted in the seventh
paragraph over that given in the second

paragraph ..
The seventh paragraph does not

alter the nshares devised" except in
the form of the

corpus~

By

the second

provision of the Will, Orvis Call and
Bessie Call Nielson was to take this
property share and share alikec

The

seventh provision only establishes th
same ownerships in the substituted
asset that existed in the asset
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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granted by the second paragrapha
It is urged that the presumption
that elevates indefinite gifts
standing alone to fee simple should
operate here in spite of the fact
that it would change the express given
duration of the shares devised to Orvis
Call and Bessie Call Nielson.

This

Will is perfectly capable of a construction that interprets each part
thereof in relation to each other so
as to form a consistant whole as required by Section 74=2=5, UCA,

1953~

This is possible without adding words

to the will as urged by Respondant
(Respondant's brief p 15) and without
any repugnance becau~H~ of inconsistancy.,

This requires an interpretation, however,
that the first takers receive life estates.
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REPLY TO PART V

Council makes a point that the
granting provisions of the Will does
n~t

say life

say fee

estate~

simple~

It also does not

It is simply a grant in

i'ndefinite terms indicating neither life
estate nor fee which is coupled with a
restricted power of exchange with a gift
over upon the death of the first takersQ
(See 33 Am jur, Life Estates, Remainders,
Etc. ~ 30; 36 ALR 1080; 76 ALR 1154; 7 ALR
838; 10 ALR 756; 17 ALR 2d 7; 75 ALR 71;
Am Law Institute, Property, Vol,l, § llle

The balance of the cont rent io:n.s of

Part V merely assume the question in point
. namely, what was the size of the

estate~

Respondant argues rules of law that take
effect only after it is determined that t
estate is in fee or that the power of exchange is an abscolut e power o·iF dH spos:i
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REPLY TO PART VI
The contention that the interpre=
ta~ion

of the trial court is consistant

with the whole will seems best refuted
by respondant's arguments on repugnancy
(respondant's brief pp 9-13)G

Even

respondant acknowledges that the trial
court's ruling requires the repugnancy
doctrine because of inconsistancy as
well as the addition of words to the
terms set forth in the will.
The balance of the contentions of
respondants brief cone erni ng a1

a~ 1 edged

attempt by Don Lewis Rvan to :aKe the
estates of the first taker and a sup·
posed burden being placed the-eon

jus~

is not in conformity 1t1rith the al"' 'gatJ..ons
of appellant.

He cl

remainder and no

an estatQ in

more~
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CONCLUSION
Respondant's brief fails to supply
any support that would vary the required

rules of constructiona
h~s

been cited that

w~s

Not one case
not

distin~

contentions of Respondant0

Respectfully submitted,

a\TCH & CHIDESTER
Attorney~ for Appellant
51 West Center
Heber'i! Ut@!.h

St~eet
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